资料仓库 · 2022年10月7日

LGBTQ Russians Were Putin’s First Target in His War on the West

Standing before a room full of top Russian officials in the ornate St. George’s Hall of the Grand Kremlin Palace last Friday, Russian President Vladimir Putin delivered a speech announcing the annexation of four Ukrainian territories that was bilious even by his own standards. He ticked off grievances against the West, starting in the 17th century, accusing the Western world of creating a “neocolonial system” with a view of destroying Russia. It was a familiar rendition of Putin’s bingo card of geopolitical resentments—and then he transitioned to the issue of gay and transgender rights.

“Do we want children from elementary school to be imposed with things that lead to degradation and extinction?” Putin asked. “Do we want them to be taught that instead of men and women, there are supposedly some other genders and to be offered sex-change surgeries?”

It may have seemed like an unexpected diversion, but in Putin’s mind, the war in Ukraine and his country’s decadelong assault on LGBTQ rights are two sides of the same coin. Scapegoated in the state media and portrayed as agents of Western influence, Russia’s queer community was the canary in the coal mine of the wider offensive against the West that was to follow when Putin returned to the presidency in 2012.

“It’s been part of his rhetoric and, more broadly, the rhetoric of the Kremlin and the Russian regime … to explicitly connect geopolitics to gender politics and to the resistance to LGBT rights,” said Emil Edenborg, associate professor of gender studies at Stockholm University.

It’s not just Putin. Patriarch Kirill, head of the Russian Orthodox Church, made the connection explicit in a sermon in March, shortly after the war began. He portrayed the war as a struggle between those seeking to reject Western values and gay pride parades held as, in his words, “loyalty test[s]” to Western governments.

Putin started pumping gas down the coal mine when he came back to the presidency after switching seats with former Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev for a term. Putin’s return saw the largest street protests in Russia since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Electoral fraud drove more than 100,000 people out onto the streets of Moscow, but Putin thought he saw a Western hand—specifically then-U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s—behind the crowds of protesters huddled in sub-zero temperatures.

Putin’s first two terms in office were defined by a brutal counterterrorism campaign in Chechnya and a bump in living standards. But by 2013, the Kremlin needed a new target. A new lexicon of “traditional family values” began to creep into the statements of senior Russian officials and state television. After the identity crisis brought about the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, it was an attempt to redefine what it meant to be Russian: conservative, religious, and family oriented. More importantly, it defined what Russia was not: individualistic, hedonistic, and Western. It marked the beginning of a deepening relationship between the Russian state and the orthodox church—and the country’s queer community provided a ready target for religious nationalists.

Kremlin officials seized on the idea of banning “gay propaganda,” taking an obscure law that had been gaining steam in regional legislatures since 2006 and passing it at the federal level in 2013. The vaguely worded law prohibits any discussions of homosexuality in places or formats that may be accessible to minors, including in the media and online. It was, as later described by Human Rights Watch, a “classic example of political homophobia” for “political gain.”

The geopolitical dimensions to the Kremlin’s sudden interest in cracking down on LGBTQ rights were evident from the start. “We can see how many of the Euro-Atlantic countries are actually rejecting their roots, including the Christian values that constitute the basis of Western civilization,” Putin said in a speech at the annual meeting of the Valdai Discussion Club in September 2013. “They are implementing policies that equate large families with same-sex partnerships, belief in God with the belief in Satan.”

The law’s passage was accompanied by a surge in coverage in Russian state media, which dutifully sought to reinforce the idea that queer people posed a threat to the Russian way of life. According to Russian media monitoring organization Medialogiya, reports about homosexuality skyrocketed from just 11 in 2011 to more than 160 in 2013. Hate-filled, offensive, and (more often than not) patently untrue, these reports gave rise to a new vocabulary of “gender fascism.”

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